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Search and Deliberation in International Exchange:
Learning from Multinational Trade
About Lags, Distance Effects, and Home Bias
In this paper we compare the responsiveness of U.S.
multinational enterprises’ intrafirm trade to U.S. arm’s length trade to changes
in the real exchange rate.  We do for three reasons.  One aim is to shed new
light on the long debated question of whether MNEs’ trade responses are
stickier than arm’s length trade.1  Existing views on intrafirm trade fall in two
camps: one that believes intrafirm trade is or ought to be no different from
arm’s length trade,2 and one that believes that such trade is less responsive than
arm’s length trade.3  Proponents of the latter view predict slow and small
responses for MNEs because intrafirm behavior, they argue, reflects
hierarchical or command behavior and is not likely to be as sensitive to market
considerations as arm’s length transactions.  In contrast, we will argue that
MNEs ought to respond faster and more vigorously, not because of special
access to cross-border production capacity, but rather because of information
advantages arising out of multinational operations.
                                               
1 See Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978: esp. chapter eight).
2 See Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978); Caves (1996).
3 See Goldsbrough (1981); Helleiner (1981:3); Little (1986:46); Cho(1990); and Encarnation
(1992).  Gerald Helleiner (1981: 3), has written that intrafirm trade "can and usually do[es] take place
in consequence of central commands rather than in response to price signals..."  Likewise, Little
(1986: 46) has argued that "Because intra-firm trade is potentially 'managed' trade...the pace or size
of its adjustment" differs "from that of trade between unaffiliated firms." Goldsbrough (1981: 573)
argues that trade flows generated by the location decisions of a firm with large fixed investments in
several countries may not respond as rapidly to shifts in relative prices as those of an independent
producer...unconcerned with the effect of its actions on the profitability of overseas affiliates.4
Our second aim is to suggest some microfoundations for three extensively
documented macro patterns that have puzzled international economists.  The first
puzzle pertains to the presence of long lags in trade responses to exchange rates.  Even
when exchange rate changes cause large and “permanent” shifts in relative prices, the
geographic distribution of economic activity shifts only slowly and hesitatingly.
Established buyer-supplier relationships appear sticky and switching is lagged.  How
might we explain these considerable lags and, moreover, why when national incomes
rise or fall, does international trade adjust both without long lags and more vigorously?
The second puzzle pertains to the disproportionately large dampening effect
that physical distance appears to have on bilateral trade.  The puzzle, as many
observers have noted, is that distance effects appear to be far greater than what might
be explained by transport costs alone.   The third puzzle, and the one that has sparked
the most interest recently, pertains to the “home bias” in international trade and
finance.  One well-known study (McCallum, 1995) examined the trade effects of the
seemingly “innocuous” U.S.-Canada border on the grounds that “if borders didn’t
matter” this one must provide the prototypical case.4  But, after controlling for market
size and comparative advantage, this study found that in 1988, the year of the data,
Canadians were 22 times more likely to trade with fellow Canadians than with persons
equally distant but residing in the United States.  Other studies (e.g., Wei, 1996) have
reported smaller quantitative effects, but they too support the consensus that there is a
marked home bias in economic activity.
While these empirical quandaries have stimulated new bouts of economic
theorizing, unifying and satisfactory explanations have eluded economists. Paul R.
                                               
4  John McCallum (1995), “National borders matter: Canada-U.S. regional trade patterns,”
American Economic Review, June, 85 (3): 615-623.5
Krugman and Richard Baldwin (1987) have suggested that economists’ macro models
lack plausible micro foundations.  Echoing these views, trade theorist Gene Grossman
(1998: 31) avers that, “[These macro patterns lead] me to believe that something is
missing from our trade models, be they of the Hecksher-Ohlin or Dixit-Stiglitz-
Krugman variety.  It seems we need models where distance (and common polity, and
common language, and common culture) play more of a role.  I suspect this is a model
with imperfect information, where familiarity declines rapidly with distance...”
In the course of addressing our first question about the relative speed and vigor
with which MNEs respond to exchange rate changes, we will, in this chapter, suggest
a tentative hypothesis that resonates with the preceding views and offers some
plausible micro foundations to the puzzling macro patterns just described.  The
hypothesis is built around a line of generalization that can be sketched as follows:  In
pursuing cross-border economic opportunities, firms engage in a process of search and
deliberation.  Search refers to acts involved in identifying potential exchange partners,
and deliberation refers to acts involved in assessing their reliability and trustworthiness.
Search grows more important the more spatially dispersed economic opportunities
become, and deliberation grows more important the more costly it becomes to reverse
allocative actions or their effects.  In many instances, institutions--such as organized
markets and rating agencies--and innovations--such as advertising and warranties--
have emerged to relieve the problems of search and deliberation, and, in these
instances, firms can readily pursue the economic opportunities they perceive.
However, in international trade and investment such institutions and
innovations don’t exist or don’t work well enough.  Search and deliberation remain
problematic and firms, because of the resulting information insufficiency, exhibit a
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great deal of stickiness and lagged (or progressive) adjustment in responding to
apparent cross-border economic opportunities.  In these circumstances, firms often
turn to their business and social networks, because, frequently, those networks can
help alleviate problems of search and deliberation and enable firms to uncover and
exploit cross-border economic opportunities.
If this line of argumentation is valid, then, by extension, in the domain of
international economic exchange, firms that are embedded in well-elaborated social
and business networks will tend to enjoy information advantages by virtue of which
they will adapt and respond more proficiently to new economic opportunities.  In
particular, relative to their purely domestic counterparts, MNEs will tend to be
embedded abroad in better-elaborated social networks.  This latter characteristic ought
to provide MNEs with relative information advantages (vis-à-vis the problems of
search and deliberation), and, in turn, on the back of these information advantage
MNEs ought to exhibit speedier and more vigorous import responses.
In the sections that follow, we will flesh out the concepts of search and
deliberation, and discuss, within that frame, multinationals’ potential network
advantages.  In the subsequent section, we will contrast empirically multinational and
non-multinational enterprises’ international trade responses to exchange rate changes.
To anticipate, after controlling for industry, partner country, income effects, and
certain other variables, we find that relative to arm’s length trade, MNEs’ intrafirm
trade exhibits both speedier and larger responses to common real exchange rate
changes.  In our discussion, we will consider alternative explanations for our empirical
findings.
We will conclude by proposing some speculative micro-macro linkages
between the problems of search and deliberation, the economic behavior of firms, and7
the puzzling macro patterns we alluded to above.  Our sense is that at the current pace,
the trends of regionalization and globalization will tend to “shrink the globe” and
dampen distance and border effects.  Still, considering how profound cross-border
information discontinuities appear to be, we would speculate that distance, and,
particularly, border effects in economic exchange, will persist noticeably well into the
future.  Of course, to the extent the proportion of multinationals in the population of
firms grows (and there are some reasons to anticipate this), information discontinuities
will be better patched and a deeper integration across distance and borders will be
fostered.
THE PROBLEMS OF SEARCH AND DELIBERATION
By “search” we refer to acts involved in identifying potential exchange
partners.  Firms engage in search when they sense that response to a perceived
economic opportunity or threat involves action that might lie outside the pattern of
current activities and exchange relationships.  In general, search grows more
problematic the more spread out potential exchange partners are.  Organized markets
exist in many undifferentiated commodities, but even there, trading companies have
had to emerge to link supply with remote demand.  As for differentiated goods and
goods made to order, smaller volumes and deliberation problems have tended to keep
markets local, national, or regional.
In any event, regardless of the nature of the commodity, search problems are
primarily a function of spatial dispersion.  A corollary is that distance erodes economic
exchange; distance “always shows up as a crucial determinant of trade” (Krugman,
1995: 1273).  Importantly, “shipping costs are quite small for most goods that can be
shipped at all; yet trade falls off quite strongly with distance.”8
Let us turn now to the problem of deliberation.  By “deliberation,” we refer to
acts involved in assessing the reliability and trustworthiness of potential exchange
partners.  Like search, deliberation is also an information intensive process.  But, if
search is aimed at reducing incomplete information about the present, deliberation is
aimed at reducing incomplete information about the present and especially the future.
Deliberation is a non-issue if actors can be certain or nearly certain about: (i) the
quality of what is to be exchanged, and (ii) the manner in which exchange partners will
discharge mutual obligations in the future.  But in the absence of certainty, deliberation
enters the picture and it grows more important the more costly it becomes to reverse
allocative actions or their effects.  When actors think deliberation is important but
problematic, they will tend to act reluctantly and progressively.  In such circumstances,
economic actions are unlikely to be influenced by relative prices alone.
Indeed, even in the face of changes in relative prices, buyer-supplier
relationships are often noted to be sticky.  A good part of the explanation is known to
lie in the fact that in many buyer-supplier relationships switching-out and switching-in
are costly (Webster and Wind, 1972; Sheppard and Tuchinsky, 1996).  As in labor
markets, assessing the reliability, timeliness, and capabilities of a new exchange partner
is a process of discovery.  As this process of discovery unfolds the buying firm might
be: (i) placing in circulation a stock of inferior products that upon discovery will be
costly to recover and upgrade (e.g., the recall of vehicles fitted with defective
components); (ii) developing costly-to-reverse dependencies with the new supplier (as
might happen when a firm turns over the management of its computer and information
systems to an outside vendor); and (iii) closing-off a return to previous exchange
partners since the latter are likely to have tied up with other customers or even exited
the business altogether.  These are some of the key drivers of uninsurable costs that9
firms are bound to weigh before switching or settling upon exchange partners.  As
these drivers gain salience, firms will sense a greater need to obtain reliable information
about a potential exchange partner.  If, however, the requisite information cannot be
assembled, firms are wont to forego potential profit opportunities.  Economic
opportunities, like proverbial “dollar bills on the sidewalk,” will lie waiting to be
picked up.
In circumstances where search and deliberation are problematic, business and
social networks tend to assume significance in shaping and explaining economic
actions and outcomes.  Gould’s (1994) study of immigrants’ trade effects provides an
illustration.  Gould (pp. 302-303) notes that immigrants bring many things with them,
“perhaps key among these being...ties or links...[back] to their home country...”  These
social ties, he notes, “can lower...[the] costs associated with obtaining foreign market
information and establishing trade relationships.”  Gould hypothesizes that immigrants’
social ties ought to lead to a “direct increase in [trade] between the host and home
countries,” and he finds support for this view in his empirical analysis.
Correspondingly, the information advantages posited in Granovetter’s (1985)
notion of embeddedness are especially pertinent to the problem of deliberation.  Recall
that, to large extent, deliberation involves an attempt to resolve incomplete
information about the future behavior of exchange partners.  In this endeavor, it is
natural that we look to exchange partners’ antecedents, because, rightly or wrongly,
we believe past behavior can offer us valuable clues about future behavior.  It follows
then that embeddedness can aid deliberation because the confidence with which we can
assess the reliability and trustworthiness of a potential exchange partner tends to be
much higher when we ourselves or someone we know well has had “concrete personal10
relations” with the actor in question (see Gulati, 1995; Portes and Sensenbrenner,
1995; Uzzi, 1997).
SEARCH AND DELIBERATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
For most managers around the world, family and community ties, school and
university ties, banking and boardroom ties, chamber of commerce and trade
association ties, and ties to employers and co-workers, all tend to be largely local or
national.  As a result, more than distance, language, and culture separates managers
and the firms they work in from counterparts residing outside their national borders.
Indeed, distance and borders engender information discontinuities.
By implication, the problems of search and deliberation are undoubtedly
magnified in economic exchange that must occur across national borders.  Indeed,
studies on international exchange and organizational buying confirm this latter
contention (see Webster and Wind, 1972; Egan and Moody, 1992; Gulati, 1995;
Martin, Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 1995; Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996).  A recent
review article (Liang and Parkhe, 1997: 510-511) notes that, “Domestic vendor
selection is more often a ‘choice’ situation...  International vendor selection, on the
other hand, often is a ‘search’ situation, where the information processing load has a
higher probability of exceeding the bound of human rationality.”  “Often the favored
search approach is simply to call and rely upon a known contact for a recommendation
[Liang and Stump, 1996]; objective information available in government sources is
largely ignored [Min and Galle, 1991]” (p. 509).
Deliberation too is a problem of considerable proportions in international
exchange.  U.S. importers who participated in one interview-based study expressed
that they “prefer long-term, stable, and direct relationships because [such relationships]11
‘make good business sense’” (Egan and Moody, 1992: 325).  “Finding and evaluating”
new suppliers abroad is costly, buyer-supplier mutual learning (what we termed co-
specialization) is “cumulative,” and any “mutual obligation and trust develops
incrementally.”  International buyers, this study noted, “are therefore reluctant to lose
this advantage and start over with new partners” (p. 325).  The fingerprints of costly-
to-reverse allocative actions are clearly visible here.  Further, consistent with our
embeddedness arguments, "When evaluating potential suppliers, virtually all buyers
first seek information within their own network...of product-specific buyers and
suppliers...  The first source of information is the personal judgement of other buyers.”
Finally, given that both search and deliberation are problematic in international trade,
by our earlier reasoning, we would anticipate that the price mechanism does not
operate too well in economic activity that occurs across national borders.  As we noted
at the top of the chapter, this contention too receives empirical support: price
dispersion, lagged adjustment, and visibly modest price elasticities have been persistent
quandaries in international trade (see Krugman and Baldwin, 1987; Lawrence, 1990;
Engel and Rogers, 1996).
If international economic exchange is encumbered by the problems of search
and deliberation, then we would anticipate actors embedded in well-elaborated cross-
border networks to exhibit relatively greater and speedier responses to international
economic opportunities.  This, in a nutshell, is why we would expect multinationals’
trade responses to exchange rate changes to be speedier and more vigorous than trade
that occurs at arm’s length.
MULTINATIONALS’ INFORMATION ADVANTAGES12
Multinational enterprises, by virtue of the fact that they operate in two or more
countries, have the potential of being simultaneously embedded in two or more distinct
social networks (Kogut, 1983; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990).  Most established MNEs
have actualized this potential by developing concrete relations with local suppliers,
customers, labor, and financial institutions.  These external ties are supplemented to
lesser or greater extents by internal ties within the MNE (usually at least between the
headoffice and the various foreign affiliates).  According to one empirical study of the
“information sources” used by U.S. MNE managers, “When a headquarters executive
in an [MNE] acquires external information, the most likely single source of this
information is the corporation’s own staff abroad (Keegan, 1974: 414).”  Internal ties
among managers in an MNE emerge from both formal and informal interaction,
rotation, and other socialization processes (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977; Prahalad and
Doz, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989).  This no doubt costly investment has long
been thought to place the MNE in an advantageous position vis-à-vis non-
multinational enterprises (Vernon, 1979; Kogut, 1983; Dunning and Rugman, 1985;
Lessard, 1986).
The sequence of events that leads to the possession of this advantage can be
described as follows: an MNE locates and operates facilities in another advanced
country when demand for its products in that country (and the neighboring region)
grows sizable and is served best through a local facility.  Routine operation of the
foreign facility generates a set of business relationships and a continually replenished
stock of information about actual prices, the existence, location, and precise needs and
capabilities of buyers and, importantly, suppliers in that region.  In his early study of
U.S. multinationals’ expansion abroad, Knickerbocker (1973: 26) put it thus:13
When firm A starts to manufacture in country X, its subsidiary management, and
perhaps its headquarters management, are exposed to factor inputs and technologies that
may differ in terms of type, quality, or cost from those previously encountered in the
United States or elsewhere.  In responding to this new matrix of factors, firm A may find
that it can use new raw materials, or it may devise new manufacturing processes, or it
may even uncover new product possibilities.  Moreover, information about the
discoveries can be transferred to other parts of A’s organization.
Of course, experiences are likely to vary quite a bit across firms and locations; it can
hardly be otherwise.  But, in general, over time, there will be a tendency for the MNE
to become embedded in the host environment.
Against this setting, imagine that in response to a change in exchange rates the
MNE’s home facility wants to explore the feasibility and economics of sourcing
intermediate inputs from the foreign country.  The MNE’s home facility ought to be
able to do so relatively easily because the search and deliberation necessary to exploit
the new economic opportunity is likely to be behind it.  The MNE’s purely domestic
counterparts, on the other hand, will tend to confront a more difficult situation because
information and connections required to operate at home are invariably different from
that required for buying and selling abroad.  Moreover, local presence is frequently a
necessary condition for exchanging information reliably and for settling transactions
under advantageous terms (Keegan, 1974; Egan and Moody, 1992).
This is not to say that non-multinationals working via arm’s length
relationships will have no trade responses.  On the contrary, given the growing
intensity of competition, the large size of exchange rate changes over the last years,
and the fact that international trade existed long before anyone heard of multinational
enterprises, we fully anticipate non-multinationals to respond and there is a voluminous
empirical research that tells us they do (Stern, Francis, and Schumacher, 1976).  But,
relative to their purely domestic counterparts, MNEs will tend to be embedded abroad
in better-elaborated social networks.  This characteristic of better structural and14
relational embeddedness ought to provide MNEs with information advantages (vis-à-
vis the problems of search and deliberation), and, in turn, on the back of these
information advantage MNEs ought to exhibit speedier and more vigorous import
responses.  The reasons for greater speed are obvious, and the reasons for greater
vigor can be stated as follows: As argued earlier, deliberation problems tend to weaken
firms’ willingness to substitute on the basis of price.  Relative to non-multinational
enterprises, MNEs, for reasons just laid out, face smaller deliberation problems.  Other
things equal then, MNEs ought to exhibit higher exchange rate elasticities.  Further,
the costs of search and deliberation can be considered as additive to the purchase price
(Stigler, 1961).  Firms that face higher net prices will tend to trade smaller volumes
than those that face lower net prices.  By this logic too, MNEs ought to exhibit higher
exchange rate elasticities.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The spirit of the analysis to be conducted is as follows.  Using the United
States as the focal country, let us pick an industry, partner country, and a time period.
Having done that, let us examine in the industry and period chosen the speed and
elasticity with which U.S. imports from that partner country respond to changes in the
U.S. dollar’s real exchange rate (vis-à-vis the currency of that partner country).  Let us
now compare the results so obtained to estimates of the same coefficients in the same
industry, partner country, and time period, but for U.S. imports from U.S.
multinationals that have operations in that partner country.  Controlling for industry,
country, and time period in this manner, we should, according to our hypothesis,
observe that U.S. imports from MNEs exhibit statistically larger elasticities (i.e.,
greater responses) and shorter lags (i.e., speedier responses) in adapting to the15
common real exchange rate changes.  To be sure, any observed differences will be
consistent with our search and deliberation story only if we can rule out MNE
advantages that arise from other important sources such as their size and
sophistication.  We will, therefore, attempt to control for these potentially confounding
factors.
Data Sources and Coverage
Data used in the analysis come from three sources: the U.S. Department of
Commerce, the OECD, and the IMF.  Industry by country by year U.S. import data
were obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce.  Nominal exchange rates are
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  GDP data and industry-and-
country-specific producer prices (that are used to calculate industry-by-country-
specific real exchange rates) are from the OECD’s Indicators of Industrial Activity.
Data on R&D expenditure are from the OECD (1997) publication entitled Research
and Development in Industry.  Estimates of U.S. importers’ employment size (used as
an indicator of U.S. importers’ firm size) are based upon employment figures reported
in the OECD (1997) publication entitled Globalisation and Small and Medium
Enterprises: Volume 2.  All data pertaining to U.S. multinationals are from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) annual surveys of the operations of U.S.
multinationals and their foreign affiliates.  Since these latter data are available only on
an annual basis, the analysis below is conducted only on annual data (using averages in
the case of exchange rates and year-end data for all other variables).
Coverage is guided primarily by the availability of data (particularly on the
operations of U.S. multinationals).  Accordingly, the analysis below pertains to U.S.
imports between 1977 and 1994 of manufactured goods in four industries--food and16
related products, chemicals and allied products, non-electrical machinery, and electric
and electronic products, and from nine countries--Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom.  U.S. imports in the four
industries from the nine countries accounted in 1994 for $123 billion or a little over a
fifth of all U.S. manufacturing imports in that same year.  U.S. MNEs’ intrafirm
imports accounted for a 10 to 15 percent share of that total.  Depending on the
specification estimated, the number of observations range from around 300 to one
thousand.  The lower limit is driven by the U.S. MNE data which frequently are
missing.  In particular, between 1979-1981 the BEA did not conduct surveys of U.S.
MNEs’ foreign operations; therefore, MNE data for those three years are unavailable.
Nevertheless, by focusing on U.S.-headquartered MNEs we gain an important
advantage deriving from the fact that by 1977, the first year covered in our study,
these entities had already established operations in Europe, Canada, Australia, and
Japan.  In fact, according to the data, between 1977 and 1994, the number of U.S.
MNE parents in manufacturing actually declined slightly from 1,842 to 1,543 (perhaps
not inconsistent with the consolidation that has taken place domestically); and the
number of foreign affiliates of these parents in the nine countries of interest declined
slightly as well (mainly in Canada) going from 11,771 to 11,189 (USDIA 1977: Tables,
B and C; USDIA 1994: Tables II.A.1 and II.A.2).  This relative stability in MNE
affiliates abroad ought to mitigate concerns about both shifts in the composition of the
sample and any potential simultaneity bias.  Moreover, in the industries and countries
we are studying, less than 10 (typically less than 5) percent of the output of U.S. firms’
foreign affiliates is destined for shipment back to United States.  The point being, these
affiliates were not set up as low-cost export platforms to serve the U.S. market, rather
their priority from the start has been to serve local and regional markets abroad.  This17
assures us that our sample data are not biased in favor of the hypotheses we will be
exploring.
It must be noted here, that although the MNE trade figures used in this study
are the only set reported on a country-by-industry basis, these data are primarily
intrafirm trade data.  Of the U.S. imports originated by U.S. MNEs’ foreign affiliates
nearly 80 percent are shipped to the U.S. parent.  As we mentioned above, according
to existing views, intrafirm trade ought to be no different from arm’s length trade, or it
ought to be less responsive than arm’s length trade.  Yet, since MNE intrafirm trade is
likely to embody both internal and external ties and benefit from the hypothesized
information advantages, we expect U.S. intrafirm imports to be more responsive,
ceteris paribus.
Dependent Variable
In working with international trade we have, in principle, a choice to focus on
imports or exports.  Although the latter is often the focus of empirical and policy
oriented research, in our case, it is not as suitable as imports.  The reason for this is
straightforward: multinational enterprises are, in a sense, identified innately with
exports and success in export markets (Vernon, 1966; Dunning, 1974; Caves, 1996).
Hence, by sticking to imports we avoid biasing the results in favor of MNEs.  For
instance, in the case of imports, there is no destination-market advantage to be had by
MNEs.  Purely domestic firms ought to be equally “at home” in the United States.
Further, since the United States is a more open economy than most, U.S. imports are
likely to be a better register (than exports) of responses to new international economic
opportunities.  In other words, by selecting imports, variation in the dependent variable
is likely to be enhanced.18
Accordingly, the dependent variable used in the analysis is the log of U.S.
imports from a particular country in a given industry and year.  Ideally, we would want
to state imports in volume terms, however, since country and industry-specific import
prices are not available, we use nominal import value figures.  Other empirical studies
(e.g., Junz and Rhomberg, 1972; Lawrence, 1990) have also employed this approach
noting that the magnitude of the reported elasticities will be greater in absolute terms.
Since we will use nominal figures for both MNEs and overall U.S. imports, this should
not throw off our comparative analysis.  Of course, transfer prices emerge as a
potential issue and we will discuss it below.
Independent Variables
The first independent variable of interest is the real exchange rate (which is
stated in terms of foreign currency units per U.S. dollar).  We want to examine both
the magnitude of the elasticity and the pattern of lags exhibited by U.S. MNEs and
average U.S. importers in responding to the level of this independent variable.  While
most studies tend to use exchange rates that are simply averaged across countries, we
measure this variable in country, industry, and year specific terms.  For instance, in the
case of U.S. imports of chemicals from Germany, we construct the real exchange rate
by adjusting the mark-dollar nominal rate to reflect producer prices in the U.S. and
German chemical industries.  In this manner, we construct an index of real exchange
rates for the years 1977 through 1994 and use it in log terms in the analysis.
Another independent variable of interest is the interaction term between the
real exchange rate and an MNE dummy variable.  In regressions that pool MNE and
average-U.S. importer responses, we would anticipate the coefficient on this
interaction term (MNE*exchange rate) to be positive and statistically significant.  That19
is, after controlling for industry, year, partner country, and other variables stated
below, MNEs, by virtue of their information advantages, ought to exhibit greater
responsiveness to the level of the exchange rate than the average (non-multinational)
U.S. importer.
Control Variables
There are several control variables that warrant inclusion in our analysis.  First,
we want to recognize that the decisions of U.S. firms to source inputs from abroad are
influenced not only by exchange rates, but also by changes in the levels of their
business activity.  We, therefore, include as a control variable price-adjusted U.S.
industry-specific GDP (gross domestic product).  This is an important variable in its
own right, but here it gives us added insight, because, when their activity levels
change, organizations (we assume) need to simply adjust quantities purchased up or
down, they do not switch suppliers and they do not have to search or deliberate.
According to our hypothesis, in the absence of search and deliberation,
adjustment should be prompt and vigorous.  We would anticipate, therefore, that any
lags on the activity variable would be shorter than those observed on exchange rates.
And, without ruling out other causes for this, we would also anticipate that the
coefficient on this variable to be larger than the coefficient on exchange rates.
Importantly, to the extent that MNEs trade better internationally by virtue of
their greater experience, size, and sophistication, we should pick this up in an
MNE*GDP interaction term.  By our theory, a positive coefficient on this interaction
term would suggest the presence of advantages not related to superior networks and
information.  Accordingly, the MNE*GDP coefficient could serve as a crude control20
against which we can compare the MNE*exchange rate coefficient (anticipating the
latter to be larger and more significant than the former).
To control separately for firm size, we include a firm size*exchange rate
interaction term because larger firms (read MNEs) can more readily justify the costs of
having on their staff exchange rate specialists and persons proficient in foreign
languages.  Also, to the extent search and switching costs are fixed they will be more
easily borne by large rather than small firms.  Finally, large firms will tend to possess
greater experience and expertise in successfully executing the logistics called for in
international trade.  On the other hand, it is well known that size can be a mixed
blessing: large firms are more susceptible to “internal opportunism” and inter-divisional
“logrolling” both of which can impede flexibility and responsiveness (Williamson,
1975).  Large firms are also more likely to be unionized and this may influence their
ability and willingness to substitute home content with imports.  Lastly, large size
might confer scale economies that make short-run adjustments suboptimal.  In any
event, we use the average number of employees per U.S. firm in a given industry and
year as an indicator of firm size.  Employment figures are not available for U.S.
importers; so, instead, we use estimates based on figures for U.S. exporters.  For
MNEs, the figures used are average MNE employment by industry.  These data are
also entered in log terms in the firm size*exchange rate interaction term.  (Note, firm
size is not entered by itself as an independent variable since it introduces perfect
collinearity with the industry dummies in any given year and industry.)
We also enter a time trend in the regressions to account for advances in
technology, the rise in capabilities abroad and the attendant rise in competition, and
greater liberalization in the world economy.  Further, to control for unobserved
influences, we include dummy variables for eight out of the nine countries and three21
out of the four industries.  In the regressions, then, the constant term stands for the
omitted country and industry, which, in our case, will be the United Kingdom and
machinery.
Lastly, in some models (that we don’t report here) we included R&D/Sales
ratios as a control.  Research intensity is believed to influence international trade--at
least exports (see Dunning, 1993; Kobrin, 1991).  Since U.S. imports from country X
are country X’s exports to the U.S., we controlled for foreign (i.e., country X’s)
industry-specific R&D/Sales ratios.  Since research efforts typically take time to get
reflected in new products and increased sales, we entered this variable on a two-year
lagged basis. Including this variable did not change the results (and neither did
alternative lag structures, including zero lags on R&D/Sales).
Model Estimation and Results
Equations explaining U.S. imports are estimated as variations of the following
specification:
U. S. Imports ijt =aij +b * U. S. GDP it + g * Exch. Rate ijt + d * Importer Firm Size it * Exch. Rate ijt
                           + e * Time t +z * Lagged Foreign R & D/Sales ijt +h* MNE ijt * Exch. Rate ijt +qijt .
The subscripts i, j, and t, stand, respectively, for industry, country, and year.  With the
exception of the time trend (and the R&D/Sales ratios) all variables are entered in
natural logs.  The coefficients on these latter variables, therefore, represent the
elasticity of U.S. imports to a one percent increase in the respective independent
variables.  Pooling observations across industries and countries violates normal OLS
assumptions.  To correct bias in parameter estimates, a least squares dummy variable22
approach is adopted.  Such fixed-effects models constrain the coefficients on the
independent variable to be the same across observations, but they allow unobserved
cross-sectional heterogeneity to be captured in the different intercepts.  This approach
is well suited to panel datasets that, like ours, are “short and wide” (Greene, 1990:
482-485).
Tables 1 presents the first set of results.  Consider the estimates under columns
1 and 2 in Table 1.  These models include the GDP, exchange rate, firm size, and the
country and industry dummy variables.  The first equation explains U.S. overall--
meaning MNE and non-MNE related--imports from the nine countries in the four
industries over the 1977-1994 period.  The second equation explains U.S. imports
originating from U.S. MNEs’ foreign affiliates.  In both equations, the coefficients on
U.S. GDP are, as anticipated, positive, relatively large (around 2), and statistically
significant.  On the other hand, the coefficient on the (contemporaneous) real exchange
rate is positive but not statistically significant for U.S. overall imports; however, for
MNE imports, this coefficient is positive, significant, and larger than the coefficient on
the GDP variable.  When a time trend is added to these models (not shown), the
pattern of the exchange rate coefficients remains unchanged.  However, not
surprisingly, the time trend cancels out much of the effect associated with the rise in
GDP.  As indicated by the adjusted R-squares on these models--of 0.61 and 0.77--the
models explain a significant amount of the variation in the dependent variable.
The models in the other columns in Table 1 explore the question of relative
speed of adjustment.  The results in those columns suggest clearly that MNEs exhibit
speedier responses.  Consider the models in columns 3 and 4 in Table 1.  Both those
models contain the contemporaneous and one-year lagged exchange rates.  The one-
year lagged exchange rate coefficient for U.S. overall imports now assumes statistical23
significance.  This is also the case for MNE imports, although, contemporaneous
exchange rates continue to be large and statistically significant.  When two-year lagged
exchange rates are introduced (in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1), their coefficients
assume significance for both U.S. overall and MNE imports.  However, the sum of the
exchange rate coefficients shows a marked difference between U.S. overall and MNE
imports: for the former they sum up to 0.97, while for the latter, they sum up to 4.31.
(When a lagged GDP term was added to the models in columns 5 and 6 in Table 1, it
did not take on a statistically significant coefficient.)
In Table 2, we pool the overall and MNE-only observations and estimate
regressions with interaction terms between the MNE dummy variable and the price and
activity variables.  In this table, we also explore the robustness of our results by
running regressions on selected sub-samples of the available data.  First, let us note
that the MNE*real exchange rate interaction term is positive and statistically
significant in all the models shown in Table 2.  That is, MNEs with operations in the
partner country exhibit a greater responsiveness to the level of the exchange rate than
the average U.S. importer does.  Also, in this pooled sample (see column 1, for
instance), the coefficient on the contemporaneous exchange rate assumes statistical
significance.  The coefficients on the GDP are also significant and relatively much
larger (in the absence of the time trend), and the adjusted R-square for the model in
column 1 is (at 0.73) quite satisfactory.
Now in many of the industry-country-years, especially for MNEs, import
values were small.  Upon inspection, we discovered that out of the nine countries in
the study, three--Australia, Italy, and Switzerland--had fragmentary and relatively
small trade figures.  To see whether these were driving the results, we ran a regression
excluding Australia, Italy, and Switzerland, and the results are presented in column 224
of Table 2.  As indicated in that column, the MNE*exchange rate coefficient retains
statistical significance and, in fact, rises in magnitude.
Next, in order to further explore MNE size and sophistication as sources of
superior MNE adjustment, we included an MNE*GDP interaction variable to the
model just reviewed.  As column 3 of Table 2 shows, the MNE*GDP interaction term
is positive and statistically significant.  This finding supports the view that MNEs enjoy
adjustment advantages that might derive from greater international experience, and
superior communication and logistics capabilities.  Yet, the coefficient on
MNE*exchange rate interaction term is much larger than that on MNE*GDP (2.24
compared to 0.51).  Further, the appropriate t- and F-tests based upon restricted and
unrestricted regressions (not shown) indicate that the coefficients are statistically
different from one another.  Running the model shown in column 3 with all available
observations (see results in column 4 of Table 2) weakens the difference between the
two coefficients but does not alter the basic finding. (The same holds true for
specifications that exclude the firm size*exchange rate interaction term).
Next we ran regressions to see whether MNEs’ information advantages were
becoming more visible over time.  We present the results of those regressions in Table
3.  Given that trade has liberalized quite significantly over the past two decades, one
might anticipate that multinationals have been able to better use their information
advantages over this time frame and have grown more responsive.  Indeed, this view
receives mild support in the results shown in column 2 of Table 3 (see, in particular,
the coefficient on MNE*real exchange rate*time).
Further, since technology has advanced and “selection pressures” are likely to
have ratcheted up over the past twenty years, it would appear that, notwithstanding
search and deliberation problems, the relative price (i.e., exchange rate) responsiveness25
of all firms ought to have trended up.  This view too is supported by the positive and
statistically significant coefficient on the real exchange rate*time interaction term in
column 3 of Table 3.  Running a model with both interaction terms (see column 4),
maintained the results but reduced to 13 percent the significance of the coefficient on
the MNE*real exchange rate*time interaction term.
In separate industry-by-industry regressions (not reported here, see Rangan,
1998), the MNE*exchange rate interaction term was positive for all four industries and
statistically significant in three (with the exception of machinery).  The unreported
results of one more set of regressions merits mention.  In order to check whether the
search and deliberation hypothesis holds even in the absence of MNE-related data, we
ran regressions using only overall U.S. import data.  Reasoning that search and
deliberation ought to be relatively easier for U.S. importers when they have to switch
away from foreign suppliers back to U.S. suppliers, we examined whether the
exchange rate coefficient was larger during dollar depreciations (say during the 1986-
90 period) than dollar appreciations (say during the 1979-85 period).  Not only was
the contemporaneous exchange rate coefficient larger during depreciations (1.51
compared to 0.43 during appreciations), it was also statistically significant at the 5
percent level.  (The other coefficients took predictable values.)5
                                               
5  Two other points also merit mention.  First, to explore the so-called “quantum effect,” we
added the absolute magnitude of the exchange rate change in some of our regressions.  Consistent
with the findings summarized in Goldstein and Khan (1985: 1075), this variable did not take a
statistically significant coefficient nor did it change the results.  Second, we acknowledge that
exchange rate expectations do not figure in our regressions.  We assume all exchange rate changes
are “permanent.”  However, we might note that to the extent expectations about exchange rate are
important, we have no reason to believe the MNEs and non-MNEs form systematically different
expectations.  Further, if the “temporariness” of exchange rate changes might be gauged by the
volatility in exchange rate changes, then exchange rate changes don’t appear to have become more
temporary.  Volatility (measured as the standard deviation of monthly percentage changes) in
exchange rates of G7 economies between 1980-85, 1986-89, 1990-94 was 1.7, 1.7, and 1.626
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND DISCUSSION
We set out to understand first whether MNEs’ intrafirm trade is stickier
relative to arm’s length trade. Our empirical results clearly indicate that this is not the
case.  In fact, consistent with our arguments about MNEs’ information advantages vis-
à-vis the problems of search and deliberation, the results indicate that even on imports
MNEs exhibit speedier and more vigorous responses to changes in real exchange rates.
To be sure, MNEs tend to enjoy internalization and experience advantages,
and, indeed, we found that the MNE*GDP coefficient took positive and significant
values.  But, we also found that the MNE*exchange rate interaction coefficient took
much larger values, and this would support our contention that problematic search and
deliberation and MNEs’ information advantages are key explanators here.  We also
found that the average firm size*exchange rate variable took either a statistically
insignificant or a significant but negative coefficient.  This finding is likely to be
explained by the presence of scale economies, but it also supports a view expressed in
a recent OECD study on globalization (1997, Vol. 1: 54): "Size does hold some
importance, especially in successfully taking the first steps to internationalisation, but
once there, it does not seem to matter much...[S]maller size can often be an
advantage."
Of course, the internalized trade issue does raise the question of transfer prices.
Intrafirm MNE transactions are typically made at internal transfer prices and internal
exchange rates that tend to be rigid (Lessard, 1986).  But if transfer prices tend to
remain stable in originating country currency terms and if company internal exchange
rates lag actual exchange rates (say because of the presence of currency hedge
                                                                                                                                     
respectively (see The Economist, October 7, 1995, Survey pg. 28).  So volatility is unlikely to be
useful as an independent variable in our regressions.27
contracts), then, ceteris paribus, MNE import values will register smaller not bigger
changes.  (In fact, in our data, the simple correlation coefficient between MNE imports
and exchange rates is close to zero.)  MNE transfer pricing practices cannot, therefore,
account for our findings.  Indeed, they would strengthen our findings and explanation.
There are two other related alternative explanations that merit discussion.
First, we have not included capacity in our regressions in this chapter.  But, as
Krugman and Baldwin (1987) point out, if capacity considerations were important,
then they ought to be manifested in lags on income effects.  This is not the case and we
can, hence, rule out capacity as a key explanatory variable.  A related alternative
explanation might argue that although capacity constraints may not play a role, it
might be that multinationals have more compatible capacity across geographies and,
therefore, they are able to exploit relative price differences better.  But in other
research (see Rangan and Lawrence, 1999: Chapter 3), we have explored this question
of compatibility, and we found that (due to their historical local-for-local strategies)
even multinationals’ production capacities were not (over the 1977-94 period)
characterized by a high degree of cross-border compatibility.
Last, but not least, there is a growing body of empirical work (based on data
unrelated to the MNE trade figures we have used) that is also reporting findings that
are consistent with our emphasis on the importance and advantages of business
networks in international trade (see Williamson, 1986; Gould, 1994; Rauch, 1997).
As for the puzzling macro patterns alluded to at the top of this paper, we have
suggested that lags and progressiveness in trade responses to exchange rates emerge
from search and deliberation problems.  Observed distance effects, we would argue,
are primarily a manifestation of search problems.  In other words, distance tends to
make search for potential exchange partners more cumbersome.  The presence of28
organized markets is likely to mitigate search problems.  By implication, distance
ought to dampen relatively more trade in goods (such as differentiated manufactures)
that are not offered on organized exchanges.  Physical distance is also likely to have
declined in importance over the past couple of decades since search is likely to have
become easier and less expensive over this period.  These hypotheses receive support
in some recent and carefully done analysis by James E. Rauch (1997).
As far as border and home bias effects, we view these as primarily a function of
deliberation problems (or, contrariwise, as a manifestation of a familiarity bias).  Now
if it were true, as would seem plausible, that trade in differentiated products represents
economic action that is more costly to reverse than trade in commodities, then
network effects ought to be relatively greater for differentiated products.  Again, we
refer the reader to Rauch (1997), wherein he reports empirical results that are
consistent with our arguments and expectations.  Rauch (1997: 28) notes, “The
coefficient on colonial ties are always positive, significant, and largest for the
differentiated commodity group in every year...”
A last piece of interesting evidence on these matters appears in a European
Commission survey conducted in mid-to-late 1995 to assess the effect on company
strategies of the EC ‘92 Single European Market initiative.  Of particular interest to us
was the response of the firms to questions on their intra-European sourcing strategies.
As shown in Table 4, with the exception of the purchase of raw materials, the vast
majority of the (13,500) responding firms did not view the removal of intra-European
border barriers as important to their sourcing strategies.  Interestingly, the figures
under “very important” and “quite important” decline predictably as they go from raw
materials, to components, to business services, to financial services.   This pattern is
more or less what one would expect to see if one believed that the importance of29
deliberation rises, as we believe it does, when one goes from raw materials to
components to services.  To be sure, we would anticipate that if the survey were
repeated a few years hence, the percentage of respondents selecting the very and quite
important columns would rise, but the declining pattern across the rows is likely to
persist.
CONCLUSION
When the identification and/ or assessment of potential exchange partners is
problematic, a situation of information insufficiency obtains and firms will appear
reluctant to pursue apparent economic opportunities.  These problems of search and
deliberation tend to become salient when economic opportunities are dispersed
spatially or when economic actions or their effects are perceived as costly to reverse.
When brought into the international setting, these simple ideas can help us
understand why certain parts of our global economy (such as currency markets) appear
extremely volatile and responsive while other parts (such as trade in manufactured
goods) exhibit visible stickiness and lagged adjustment.  Speculating further, we have
positioned in a search-deliberation framework the major types of economic activity
that span national borders (see Figure 1).  If distance is a proxy for search problems,
and borders are a proxy for deliberation problems, then, for example, we would expect
short lags and relatively small distance effects in portfolio investment.   However, we
would expect international portfolio investments to exhibit large border (or home bias)
effects.  As Rauch (1997) has remarked, foreign direct investment (FDI), on the other
hand, is to portfolio investment what trade in differentiated products is to trade in
commodities.30
What might we say about the future?  In our opinion, the technology of the
Internet has the potential to significantly ameliorate search problems.  We might
therefore anticipate that distance effects will, in the future, more closely reflect
transport costs.  However, we anticipate the familiarity bias to persist: Between two
trading partners equal in every respect except familiarity, firms will choose to conduct
business with the more familiar one.  So border effects and path dependence are very
likely to remain visible. Again, the Internet might help deliberation problems.  But, in
our opinion, it is unlikely that such amelioration will be rapid or dramatic.  On the
other hand, a protracted period of trade and investment liberalization accompanied by
a rising multinationalization of firms is likely to temper cross-border deliberation
problems.  To sum up, we expect that border effects and the home bias will diminish in
the future, but they will hardly disappear.  Above-normal price dispersion is, therefore,
likely to persist.  After all, in most markets, trust and price are likely to remain
complements and not turn into substitutes.31
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